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CHAPTER 22 
Evidence 
FREDERICK A. MC DERMOTT 
§22.1. Judicial notice: Foreign law. In the 1954 SURVEY, with refer-
ence to the duty of a trial judge to judicially notice applicable foreign 
law despite the fact that it had not been called to his attention with 
adequate particularity, it was stated that "The Supreme Judicial 
Court has avoided any general statement to the effect that the trial 
court has even the discretion, to say nothing of the responsibility, of 
taking judicial notice of foreign law, possibly because of fear that 
recognition of such discretion to notice foreign law sua sponte might 
easily ripen into the equivalent of a general mandate for research on 
the part of the trial court." 1 
That statement must now be qualified since the opinion in 
Medeiros v. Perry2 decided during the 1955 SURVEY year. There the 
Court observed, "By St. 1926, c. 168, now G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 233, 
§70, our courts may take judicial notice of the law of Rhode Island, 
even though it was not brought to the attention of the trial court. 
Hiller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 324 Mass. 24." 3 
The Hiller case does not appear to be a precedent for the statement, 
insofar as it may be taken to refer to the existence of such discretion 
in the trial court itself.4 The use of the plural "courts" may well have 
been inadvertent. Though the ruling is permissive only and does not 
change the law with respect to the rights of the parties, its effect may 
be to move a conscientious trial judge to do research which he would 
previously have left entirely to the diligence of counsel. 
§22.2. Judicial notice: Practicability of adoption by persons of the 
same faith. Since 1950, G.L., c. 210, §5B has provided in part, "In 
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§22.1. 11954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §26.l. 
2332 Mass. 158, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 19, 124 N.E.2d 240. 
31955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 20, 124 N.E.2d at 241. 
4324 Mass. 24, 27·28, 84 N.E.2d 548, 550·551 (1949). 
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making orders for adoption, the judge when practicabie must give 
custody only to persons of the same religious faith as that of the 
child." 1 
Another episode in the short but stormy history of this statute of 
interest in the field of evidence occurred during the SURVEY year. In 
Duarte et al., Petitioners,2 on an unopposed petition for adoption, 
the ~ba~~~~rt_!()QkLjiiilTdarnQirCk 2i~th~ __ ~~_br()~g1!tJQjts <it-
tention, that in th~_Er~gQminantlyCathQ!i~ __ c()rl!I!luni~J~ [New Bed-
ford] There -are--pending many applications for placements of children 
of the Catholic faith in homes that can supply both the necessary physi-
cal and spiritual requirements where this child can be placed for 
adoption, and in view of all the circumstances, it would not be 'prac-
ticable' in this instance to give custody to persons of a different re-
ligious faith than that of the child." 3 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decree dismissing the peti-
tion on the ground Jhat the i~<!~Hh<l:<l~_r!,~d}E:so takiJ.lgjlldicial!lo-
tice.. Such facts, said the Court, may havepeenpejSc)ll<iIIy _ known to 
the probate judge, but, if so, this was his knowledge as an individual 
observer outside of court, and not a matter of common knowledge or 
knowledge by notoriety. 
Although the correctness of the Court's conclusion as to the current 
content of the mass mind might well be open to serious doubt, discus-
sion upon such a line would not be useful.4 However, the Court 
seems to imply that there is no other basis on which judicial notice of 
such facts might be properly rested. Exception may well be taken to 
such a proposition. 
As the Court once said, " ... \1"e are not inclined to a narrow and c--
illiberal application of the doctrine of judicial notice." 5 The Duarte 
decision does not appear to be consistent with such a policy, nor with 
recent judicial precedent. In Petition of Mazurowski,6 discussed in 
the 1954 SURVEY,7 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld certain orders 
of the probate judge under the provisions of the so-called "Iron 
Curtain" statute, saying: 
The judge of probate ruled, we think rightly, that "Inasmuch as 
there was no adverse party" the responsibility rested upon the 
judge "to see that the proper parties are entitled to receive the 
funds at their full value." Accordingly, acting sua sponte, he 
made inquiries from the Department of State ... We think that 
it was proper for the judge to avail himself and that it is proper 
§22.2. 1 Acts of 1950, c. 737, §3. 
2331 Mass. 747, 122 N.E.2d 890 (1954). This case is also discussed in §9.3 supra. 
3331 Mass. at 749, 122 N.E.2d at 892. 
4 ["Roma locuta, causa finita."] See the dissenting opinion of Justice Ronan in 
GaIly et aI., Petitioners, 329 Mass. 143, 158, 107 N.E.2d 21, 30 (1952). 
5 Finlay v. Eastern Racing Assn., 308 Mass. 20, 27, 30 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1941). 
6331 Mass. 33, 116 N.E.2d 854 (1954). 
71954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §26.1. 
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for us to avail ourselves, of superior sources of information on 
such matters relating to foreign law and administrative regula-
tions possessed by the high executive officers of the government, .. 
but not directly available to the courts or to litigants.s 
In the Duarte case there was no qpposition to the petition which 
might have produced evidence as to-the availability of possible adopt-
ing parents of the faith of the child. There was no guardian ad 
litem appointed who might have investigated and' reported the facts 
to the court or opposed the petition on the ground of the statute, 
as was done in Goldman, Petitioner.9 The report of the Department 
of Public Welfare filed with the Probate Court as required by Acts of 
1950, c. 737, §2, now G.L., c. 210, §5A, in cases of petitions involv-
ing a child under fourteen, did not contain any information as to the 
practicability of adoption by parents of the same faith as the child, 
despite the fact that a report adequate to "give the court full knowl-
edge of the desirability of the proposed adoption" has been held to 
be a condition pre'cedent to a decree on such a petition, which the 
Probate Court is powerless to waive.10 In the Duarte case, the attempt 
of the probate judge to inform himself by judicial notice was held to 
be error. 
While it has always been regarded as proper for the court to take 
into account the matter of religion in adoption cases,n Section 5B 
made the practicability of adoption by parents of the same faith as the 
child the controlling factor, as a matter of public policy of the Com-
monwealth. The facts relevant in each case should be ensured of in-
telligent determination in some manner in the Probate Court, or this 
aspect of our public policy will be largely a dead letter of the statute 
law. The probate judge, under Section 5B, as well as under the well-
settled principles generally governing adoption proceedings, is obliged 
to exercise a sound discretion.12 r It is difficult to see how discretion 
can be sound if it is not informed.) 
In the Duarte case, as in the earlier case of Gaily et al., Petitioners,13 
there was a total absence of evidence or information before the court 
as to the availability of possible adopting parents of the same faith as 
the child, aside from the abortive attempt at judicial notice. Never-
S 331 Mass. at 38-39, 116 N.E.2d at 858. 
9331 Mass. 647,121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied sub nom. Goldman v. Fogarty, 
348 U.S. 942 (1955), discussed in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.10, 13.6. 
10 Krakow v. Department of Public Welfare, 326 Mass. 452, 95 N.E.2d 184 (1950). 
In the earlier cases thus far decided under G.L., c. 210, §5B - GaIly et aI., Petition-
ers, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E.2d 21 (1952); Goldman, Petitioner, note 9 supra, - as 
well as in the Duarte case, the reports filed by the Department of Public Welfare 
made no reference to the practicability of adoption by parents of the same faith 
as the child, and the omission was not adverted to in the opinions of the Supreme 
Judicial Court. 
11 Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907). 
12 Gally et aI., Petitioners, 329 Mass. 143, 147-149, 107 N.E.2d 21, 24-25 (1952). 
13 Ibid. 
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theless, it was held in the Gally case, and confirmed in the Duarte 
opinion, that adoption must be decreed where the petitioners, though 
of a disparate faith, are found to be otherwise suitable, despite the 
fact that in both cases, because of the absolute lack of evidence or in-
formation, there necessarily was a complete default of the judicial dis-
cretion required in respect to the public policy underlying Section 5B. 
The effect of the Gally case, as thus confirmed in the Duarte deci-
sion, is that there is no burden upon petitioners of a different faith to 
establish that adoption by parents of the same faith as the child is not 
practicable,14 and further, that there is no affirmative duty on the 
probate judge to take any steps to inform himself so as to be able to 
exercise the discretion required under the statute. 
It would seem to be obvious that the probate judge could easily 
make, or cause to be made, inquiry of the Department of Public Wel-
fare and of appropriate charitable corporations engaged in child care 
for reports as to the practicability of adoption by parents of the faith 
of the child. The analogy of this procedure to the historic resort to an 
amicus curiae is clear.15 That the information so obtained may not be 
within the common knowledge of the man in the street is not mate-
rial. The rights of petitioners may be guarded by notifying them of 
the information so acquired, and affording to them opportunity to 
present such other information as they might desire relevant to the 
matter to be noticed.16 
It may be conservatively thought that a finding on evidence is to be 
preferred to the taking of judicial notice on a matter of this kind. 
However, the basis on which such a finding may be arrived at in prac-
tice may be observed by examination of the record in the case of 
Goldman, Petitioner. The "£~tll!led evidence" which was held suffi-
cient in that case to support a finding of practicability of adoption 
by parents of the same faith appears to have consisted of a conglomera-
tion of hearsay no better than and of exactly the same type as would 
be obtained by the inquiry suggested above.17 In fact, the question 
appears to be one highly unsuited to trial in the usual manner upon 
evidence, and capable of being better handled on a basis of judicial 
14 The statement apparently to the contrary in Goldman, Petitioner, 331 Mass. 
647, 652, 122 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1954), must be taken to be qualified by the implica-
tions of the GaIly and Duarte decisions. 
15 See The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276, 279 (2d Cir. 1920); Beckwith and Soberheim, 
Amicus Curia - Ministers of Justice, 17 Ford. L. Rev. 38 (1948). 
16 Cf. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 804(1): "The judge shall inform the parties 
of the tenor of any matter to be judicially noticed by him and afford each of them 
reasonable opportunity to present to him information relevant to the propriety of 
taking such judicial notice or to the tenor of the matter to be noticed." 
17 The Court itself was moved to remark: "It is true ... that it would have 
been more desirable if more definite proof could have been had that suitable 
Catholic persons had actually seen these particular children and stood ready to adopt 
both of them at the same time. Such more definite proof, however, would probably, 
in the circumstances, have been hard to obtain." 331 Mass. 647, 650, 121 N.E.2d 
I. 843, 845 (1954). 
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notice, ~rticular}y!~ ~h_e __ !l0~-a~~~rsar'LatmJ:~sphere _~I_ a~ adopt!~n 
Eroc..eeding, where the best interests of the child, and not the perform-
ance put on by the parties in a courtroom, is the paramount considera-
tion. 
It may be that Acts of 1954, c. 649, now G.L., c. 210, §2A, 
which in the case of adoption of a child under fourteen by anyone 
other than a blood relative, step-parent or testamentary guardian, re-
quires approval by the Department of Public Welfare or a charitable 
corporation engaged in child care, will minimize the unfortunate ef-
fect of the holdings in the Gally and Duarte cases in the field of adop-
tion. However, no cases have yet construed that statute, and its valid-
ity, meaning, and implementation are still to be decided. 
At any rate, it is to be hoped that the implications of the decision in 
Duarte having a constrictive effect on the general exercise of judicial 
notice will not be extended in future decisions in the field of evidence. 
§22.3. Relevancy: Benefits received during claimed disability. A 
case of great importance in the trial of personal injury claims was de-
cided during the 1955 SURVEY year in McElwain v. Capotosto.1 The 
plaintiff, a post-office employee, testified to defendant's negligent op-
eration of a motor vehicle which resulted in a collision with a mail 
truck, causing injury to and disability of the plaintiff. In cross-
examination defendant sought to elicit from plaintiff an admission 
that he would be entitled to receive payor disability compensation 
while absent from work after such an accident. Plaintiff objected that 
such evidence would not be relevant in mitigation of damages. The 
judge, who was sitting without a jury, agreed, but admitted the line of 
questioning to show the degree of disability. Plaintiff's answers in-
dicated that he would get such payor compensation. The judge 
found specifically that defendant was negligent, but also found that 
plaintiff suffered no damages that were the direct and proximate result 
thereof. 
The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the record was not clear 
that plaintiff had seasonably excepted to all of the evidence, but was of 
the opinion that its admission was within the discretion of the trial 
judge, saying: 
We think the judge meant that the line of questioning had some 
bearing on the issue whether the plaintiff's absence from work was 
really due to an injury received at the time of the accident or 
was caused or prolonged by the fact that he would be paid if he 
did not work, even though the sum paid him would not reduce the 
recoverable damages for any period of disability actually due to 
the accident ... It is elementary that the extent of cross-
examination is generally within the control of the trial judge.2 
§22.3. 1332 Mass. I, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 865, 122 N.E.2d 901. 
21955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 866, 122 N.E.2d at 902. 
iii 
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The particular question does not appear to have been previously 
passed on in Massachusetts.s The holding will open a wide and fertile 
field for defense counsel. There appears to be no basis for distin-
guishing a case where plaintiff is entitled to collect substantial acci-
dent or disability insurance benefits by a contract extrinsic to his em-
ployment. In fact, there seems to be no reason to limit the ruling to 
cases where plaintiff is legally entitled to collect such payments or 
benefits - it would appear to be equally relevant to prove that a 
solicitous employer, relative, or other person gratuitously conferred 
substantial benefits on the plaintiff during the period of the alleged 
disability. It may be argued effectively that the receipt of such bene-
fits of a substantial nature in addition to the prospect of collecting 
full damages for loss of earning capacity from the defendant, for do-
ing nothing, must have appeared more attractive to the plaintiff than 
a return to work. Particularly will this be true where the plaintiff's 
symptoms are largely subjective and therefore lacking solid support-
ing medical testimony. 
The holding appears to be proper. The burden of proof on the 
issue of disability is on the plaintiff. The evidence is designed to at-
tack the credibility of his testimony on that issue. The objection that 
such evidence of itself does not create a real probability, but proves 
only the possibility that plaintiff was motivated by considerations other 
than an actual disability, is not valid. Such an objection would be 
well taken to such evidence offered by the party with the burden of 
proving a particular motive, whose case must create more than mere 
speculation or conjecture. However, when the evidence is offered, as 
here, by the defendant, who does not have the burden of proof as to 
motive, it is sufficient for admission that it may properly create in the 
mind of the fact finder a feeling of doubt sufficient to prevent per-
suasion by the plaintiff's testimony as to his claimed motive. 
In fact, the opinion, while adequate to the decision, perhaps under-
states the merits of defendant's position. The Court affirms the ruling 
as within the discretion of the trial judge. It would appear that the 
proof of facts establishing the existence of a reasonably believable 
motive other than that asserted by the plaintiff is so pertinent on the 
question of his credibility as to make its admission a matter of right 
and not of favor. The evidence is of course collateral on the merits, 
but it is certainly not collateral on plaintiff's credibility. 
It is true that the McElwain decision might be regarded as an open-
ing wedge and it might be feared that purportedly under its authority 
evidence of very remote and highly improbable motives might be of-
S No authority is cited in the opinion except for the general proposition as to the 
discretion of the trial judge. No case in Massachusetts directly in point has been 
found. See, however. Feins v. Ralby. 245 Mass. 228. 134 N.E. 530 (1923); Ceresola 
v. Joseph F. Paul Co., 224 Mass. 395. 113 N.E. 358 (1916); Bock v. Wall. 207 Mass. 
506.93 N.E. 821 (1911); Hanson &: Parker v. Wittenberg. 205 Mass. 319. 91 N.E. 383 
(1910); Clarke v. Brown. 120 Mass. 206 (1876). 
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fered. The obvious answer is stated in the opinion, namely, that 
whether other possible motivation sought to be established is of suffi-
cient probability to be relevant is a question for the trial judge, and 
in drawing the line in such matters much must necessarily be left to 
his discretion. 
§22.4. Evidential effect of notary's certificate on issue of acknowl-
edgment. In the case of Hale v. Hale,1 a divorced wife brought against 
her former husband a petition for partition of a parcel of real estate 
which had been owned by them as tenants by the entirety. At the 
trial the respondent relied upon a deed executed by the petitioner 
during the marriage conveying directly to her husband all her right, 
title and interest in the property.2 The probate judge, after hearing 
and without decision, reserved and reported the case to the Supreme 
Judicial Court upon the pleadings and the evidence. 
The deed contained the usual certificate of a notary public to the 
effect that the grantor had appeared and acknowledged the instru-
ment to be her free act and deed. Petitioner contended, however, 
that the deed was invalid under the provision of the enabling statute 
that "no such . . . conveyance . . . shall have any effect, either in 
passing title or otherwise, until the deed ... is duly acknowledged 
and recorded ... " 3 The evidence, petitioner argued, showed that 
the deed in question had not been duly acknowledged, although it had 
been recorded. 
The Court summarized the petitioner'S "evidence" of non-acknowl-
edgment as follows: "The petitioner testified that she did not re-
member appearing before a notary and acknowledging the deed. All 
that the respondent's testimony added to this was that he was not sure 
whether the petitioner signed the deed at home or at his office, but he 
took it to the registry for recording immediately after it was signed." 4 
In disposing adversely of the petitioner's contention, the Court said: 
Although there is no finding of the judge on the issue of acknowl-
edgment, we are of opinion that a finding that the deed was not 
duly acknowledged would not be justified ... the notary's cer-
tificate is proof presumptive of a valid acknowledgment. "The 
legal presumption of the proper performance of official duty by 
a public officer requires that this effect should be given it." 
Iantosca v. Iantosca, 324 Mass. 316, 321-322. Perhaps strictly 
speaking this is not a true presumption but rather the drawing 
of an inference of regularity and compliance with law. See 
Moroni v. Brawders, 317 Mass. 48, 52-53; Wigmore on Evidence 
(3rd ed.) §2534. The recitals in the certificate, of course, could 
be contradicted but we are of opinion that the evidence fell far 
§22.4. 1332 Mass. 329, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 221, 125 N.E.2d 142. 
2 See §1.7 supra for a discussion of the case on the merits. 
3 G.L., c. 209, §3. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 225, 125 N.E.2d at 144. 
\ 
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short of doing so [The petitioner's evidence] did not rebut 
the presumption or inference of regularity raised by the certifi-
cate. There would be little security in conveyances of real estate 
if a certificate of acknowledgment could be set at naught by such 
evidence fourteen years later.5 
The opinion leaves much to be desired from the point of view of the 
law of evidence.. The Court did not expressly rule upon the some-
what troublesome question as to where lies the burden of proof upon 
the issue.6 If the burden were held to be upon the petitioner to prove 
the deed invalid for lack of due acknowledgment, since in the light of 
the Court's evaluation of petitioner's "evidence" there was no evi-
dence to that effect, the decision could have been rested upon the 
fundamental proposition that where there is no evidence in his favor 
the party with the burden of proof must as a matter of law lose upon 
the issue.7 
The fact that the case was not so simply disposed of might be taken 
to indicate that the Court was of the opinion that the burden was 
upon the respondent, who relied upon the deed, to establish that it 
was duly acknowledged. The following discussion will proceed on 
that assumption. 
As has already been noted, the Court held that the notary's certifi-
cate raised either an inference or a presumption of acknowledgment; 
it also held that there was no evidence to the contrary. The decision 
on the issue was expressed in the words earlier quoted: " ... we are 
of opinion that a finding that the deed was not acknowledged would 
not be justified .... [The petitioner's evidence] did not rebut the 
presumption or inference of regularity raised by the certificate." It 
must be remembered that the Court was sitting as fact finder as well 
as ruling on questions of law. Therefore, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether the Court ruled that a finding of non-acknowledgment 
was not possible as a matter of law on the ground that the notary's 
certificate created a presumption and there was no evidence to the 
contrary,8 or, on the other hand, found the acknowledgment as a mat-
ter of fact on weighing the evidence, the certificate being given the 
effect of an inference.9 As it stands, the case might well be taken as a 
51955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 224-225, 125 N.E.2d at 144. 
6 Compare as to the burden of proof the analogous but perhaps distinguishable 
situation presented in Iantosca v. Iantosca, 324 Mass. 316, 86 N.E.2d 59 (1949), cited 
by the Court, and referred to later in this section, where the burden of proof was 
held to be upon a petitioner who sought to set aside a deed similar to that involved 
in the Hale case. 
7 Shurdut v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 320 Mass. 728, 731. 71 N.E.2d 391, 
392 (1947). 
8 Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority, 317 Mass. 297, 320-323, 58 N.E.2d 135, 138· 
139 (1944), and cases cited. 
9 Cook v. Farm Service Stores, Inc., 301 Mass. 564, 566, 569, 17 N .E.2d 890, 892, 
894 (1939). 
8
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prime example of the trial judge's classic self-protective formula: "So 
far as the question is one of fact, I find, and so far as it is one of law, I 
rule ... " 10 
The possibility that the certificate has the effect of a presumption is 
inconsistent with the recent case of Iantosca v. Iantosca,11 cited in the 
Hale opinion. That case arose on apetition by a divorced husband to 
set aside a deed executed by him during the marriage conveying realty 
directly to his wife, and also involved the evidential effect of a notary's 
certificate of acknowledgment contained in the deed. In the opinion 
the following language appears: "The burden was on the petitioner 
to prove that the deed was ineffective to pass title and, although he 
testified that he never acknowledged the deed, the judge could disbe-
lieve him and find proper acknowledgment from the evidence of the 
certificate alone." 12 This statement, which gives evidential effect to 
the notary's certificate despite the presence of evidence to the contrary, 
is inconsistent with the position of the Court in the Hale case that it is 
possible that the certificate has the effect merely of a presumption. 
Under well-settled Massachusetts authority, a presumption is not itself 
evidence, but is an artificial compelling force assigned as a matter of 
law to a basic fact in the absence of evidence to the contrary of the pre-
sumed fact, which however when met by such evidence dissolves, leav-
ing nothing for the consideration of the fact finder. 13 
The alternative offered in the Hale case, that the certificate of the 
notary be deemed to create an inference, would be consistent with 
the language of the Court in the Iantosca case, since the evidential 
force of an inference survives the introduction of evidence to the con-
trary.14 However, the vice inherent in this alternative lies in the fact 
that as a matter of law an inference, even in the total absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, presents a question for the fact finder upon 
which it is an elementary proposition that he or they may properly find 
either way. The effect of a notary's certificate of acknowledgment 
upon a det;d, in the total absence of evidence to the contrary, should 
not be so left to the whim or caprice of the fact finder, who may prop-
erly find that the naked fact of certification persuades as to due ac-
knowledgment in one case, while in another it does not. 
Fortunately there is another alternative and preferable ruling of 
law as to the evidentiary effect of the certificate which apparently was 
not adverted to in either the Iantosca or Hale decisions. That ruling 
would be that a notary's certificate constitutes prima facie evidence. 
Prima facie evidence combines the advantage of both the presumption 
10 Perry v. Hanover. 314 Mass. 167. 50 N.E.2d 41 (1943), and cases cited. See also 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Counihan in Ferullo's Case, 331 Mass. 635, 121 
N.E.2d 858 (1954). 
11324 Mass. 316. 86 N.E.2d 59 (1949). 
12324 Mass. at 321. 86 N.E.2d at 61. 
13 Duggan v. Bay State Street Ry .• 230 Mass. 370, 119 N.E. 757 (1918). See also 
the cases cited in Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority, 317 Mass. 297, 58 N.E.2d 
135 (1944). 
14 Cook v. Farm Service Stores, Inc., 301 Mass. 564, 566. 17 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1939). 
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and the inference, since it has the effect of artificially compelling a 
finding in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and of permitting a 
finding even in its presence.15 
Where the question whether particular evidence creates a presump-
tion or an inference is so close as to make the Court refrain from de-
ciding that it is one and not the other, an obviously desirable ruling is 
that it has not the effect of either alone, but that of both; in other 
words, it constitutes prima facie evidence.16 
§22.5. Opinion evidence: Admissibility. The general rule which 
excludes expert opinion testimony where it is not required was exem-
plified during the SURVEY year in Turcotte v. Dewitt.1 In that case 
plaintiff attempted to obtain the opinion of a police officer as to 
whether a skid mark observed by him at the scene of an accident was 
caused by the vehicles involved in the collision. The mark, the posi-
tions of the vehicles, and the debris in the area were described in the 
evidence. The exclusion of the offered evidence was affirmed with the 
comment that "Where a matter may easily be comprehended by jurors 
the testimony of an expert has no place. . .. On the other hand, if 
the subject is of such character or complexity that it cannot be assumed 
to be within the ordinary experience or knowledge of men, the testi-
mony of an expert is admissible." 2 
An interesting example of a close question on that seemingly sim-
ple distinction was soon afforded in Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc.S 
This was an action for death and conscious suffering. The evidence 
question arose on the issue of conscious suffering. An entry in a hos-
pital record indicated that the deceased had been immediately ren-
dered unconscious by the accident, and had remained so until her 
death. The plaintiff, the husband of the deceased, who was a physician, 
had been almost constantly at the hospital bedside of his wife for more 
than twenty-four hours until her death. As indicating consciousness 
and suffering, the plaintiff testified that he repeatedly spoke in his 
wife's ear and, while she could not speak, on four occasions she 
squeezed his hand, that he observed her facial expression, bl:eathing, 
color, and movements, that she squirmed to get away from pin pricks, 
and groaned occasionally. 
As the Court noted, citing cases, "There are decisions in which 
groans, responses and movements are considered as equally consistent 
with consciousness or unconsciousness." 4 However, the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the count for 
conscious suffering was affirmed. "But considering the fact that Dr. 
Alden was a physician of many years' experience, we think that his 
15 Ibid. 
16 See Payne v. R. H. White Co., 314 Mass. 63, 65, 49 N.E.2d 425, 426 (1943). 
§22.5. 1332 Mass. 160, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 21, 124 N .E.2d 24l. 
21955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 25, 124 N.E.2d at 245. 
s 332 Mass. 267, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 137, 124 N.E.2d 505. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 142, 124 N.E.2d at 509. 
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testimony as to the significance of his wife's appearance and behavior 
was enough to warrant the judge in submitting the case to the jury." 5 
As the Court also said, the question whether there was evidence of con-
scious suffering to go to the jury is very close. 
The questions asked of Dr. Alden were apparently identical in for-
mat with those which could pr~perly be asked of a lay witness, in di· 
recting his attention to his observations of fact.6 The answers of a 
lay witness might also well have been couched in the same terms of 
description of the facts as those given by Dr. Alden, since they were 
simple and commonplace. However, while the answers purport to 
state observations of fact only, they are pregnant with the opinion of 
the witness, which necessarily controls in the selection of the facts to 
be contained in the answers.7 
In the case of a lay witness, such an opinion, whether expressed or 
implicit, would probably be disregarded on the ground that the jury 
would be as capable as the witness of drawing the proper inference. 
The intimations of the Alden case are that the factual manifestations 
in evidence, standing alone, would have been regarded as ambiguous, 
and defendant would have been entitled to a directed verdict.8 How-
ever, the facts in evidence did not stand alone, for the Court allowed 
them to be enhanced by the fact that they were observed by a physician. 
Whether the witness was cast by the Court as a true expert in the 
subject or merely as one with greater than ordinary familiarity with 
such matters9 is not clear. Whether there is true expertness in a case 
of this sort is perhaps doubtful. A conclusion as to consciousness or 
suffering might well be regarded as an elementary judgment, like that 
of drunkenness, for example, which also is often difficult to establish by 
description of observations of fact, but is commonly inferred, and ad-
mits of lay opinion.10 
5 Ibid. 
6 See, for example, comparable questions ruled admissible in will contests: "Did 
you ever notice anything to indicate that he [testator] was not of sound mind?" Mc-
Coy v. Jordan, 184 Mass. 575, 578, 69 N.E. 358, 359 (1904). "Did you ever notice any-
thing about her [testatrix's] condition that indicated anything singular or unusual 
respecting her mental condition?" Gorham v. Moor, 197 Mass. 522. 523, 84 N.E. 436, 
437 (1908). 
7 For a pungent criticism of this aspect- of the Massachusetts rule on opinion 
testimony, see Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N.H. 2'lJ, 250-252 (1875). 
8 Where the only manifestations in evidence are as consistent with purely reflex 
actions as with conscious effort. the plaintiff cannot avoid a directed verdict, Edgar-
ton v. H. P. Welch Co., 321 Mass. 603. 613, 74 N.E.2d 674, 680 (1947), since the effect 
of such evidence on the issue would rest entirely upon speculation. Allicia v. Boston 
Revere Beach & Lynn R.R. Co., 294 Mass. 488. 490, 2 N.E.2d 457, 458 (1936). 
9 "Persons not owners but sufficiently familiar with the property in controversy to 
expFess an opinion upon its value have been allowed to do so though not regarded 
as experts." Menici v. Orton Crane and Shovel Co., 285 Mass. 499, 504, 184 N.E. 
839, 841 (1934). See also Rubin v. Town of Arlington, 327 Mass. 382, 384, 99 N.E.2d 
30, 31 (1951). 
10 "While it might not be easy accurately to describe each and every minute de-
tail indicative of intoxication, yet the principal objective symptoms are so well 
known that witnesses have always been permitted to express their opinion as to 
11
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§22.6. Opinion: Requisite evidential foundation. The requirement 
that the opinion testimony of an expert be supported by evidence of 
all the facts upon which the opinion is based was well illustrated in 
contrasting cases decided during the 1955 SURVEY year. The general 
rule appears to be simple and clear; however, in application it is 
sometimes confusing because of the incorporation of hearsay elements 
into the testimony of the expert, particularly when his opinion is given 
in evidence directly on the issue, and not on an express hypothesis as to 
the basic facts. A brief statement of the governing principles prelimi-
nary to examination of the cases is desirable. 
The ultimate relevance of any opinion testimony will of course de-
pend upon whether the facts actually found by the fact finder jibe 
with the facts upon which the opinion is based. Therefore, 'unless evi-
dence of all of the basic facts is already present when the opinion is 
offered, the opinion is not immediately relevant, and may be admitted 
de bene only, and, if the evidence then lacking is not later supplied, 
the opinion evidence is subject to a motion to strike. Even where 
all of the basic facts are already in evidence, the general rule is that, to 
avoid even the appearance of usurpation of the function of the fact 
finder, opinion may be given in evidence only in the form of an as-
sumption or hypothesis, expressed or implied, as to the basic facts.1 
This general rule, however, is relaxed in the case of the expert wit-
ness who testifies of his own knowledge as to all the basjc facts, who is 
permitted to state his opinion directly on the issue, and not only upon 
an hypothesis. A still further liberality of practice is found, most com-
monly in the case of a physician who has treated or examined a pa-
tient and has formulated an opinion based in part upon his own ob-
servation and in part upon hearsay as to the case history, who also is 
permitted to testify directly to his opinion as to the condition of the 
patient without the requirement of an hypothesis as to either the basic 
facts he observed or those he relied on from hearsay.2 Even here, how-
ever, it must be realized that the opinion is necessarily admitted as an 
exception and de bene only, whether such condition of its admission 
is expressed or not. Unless there appears other evidence to prove the 
basic facts of the case history to which the witness testified only from 
hearsay, his opinion is never rendered relevant, and is subject to a 
motion to strike. This was made clear in the Court's discussion in 
Charron's Case,3 decided at the end of the 1954 SURVEY year. 
In Kinney v. Commonwealth,4 a land damage case which came down 
the inebriety of a person." Holton v. Boston Elevated Ry., 303 Mass. 242, 246, 21 
N.E.2d 251, 253 (1939). 
§22.6. 1 Connor v. O'Donell, 230 Mass. 39, 119 N.E. 446 (191S); Commonwealth v. 
Russ, 232 Mass. 5S, 72·74, 122 N.E. 176, IS2 (1919); Commonwealth v. Moore, 323 
Mass. 70, 75, SO N.E.2d 24, 27 (194S). 
2 Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen 322, 324·325 (Mass. IS65); Cronin v. Fitchburg & 
Co. Street Ry., lSI Mass. 202, 203·204, 63 N.E. 335, 336 (1902). 
3331 Mass. 519, 120 N.E.2d 754 (1954). 
4332 Mass. 56S, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 493, 126 N.E.2d 365. 
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in the 1955 SURVEY year, the petitioners contended and there was evi-
dence to the effect that the premises had been used as a farm before the 
taking. An expert for the Commonwealth stated his opinion as to the 
value of the premises before and after the taking, and when asked to 
give the reasons therefor, testified that he had considered the location 
of the real estate, the size and topography of the property, the use to 
which the property was being put, the use for which the property had 
formerly in years gone by been used, the use to which the property was 
adapted; that this was not a farm, that it was a home which a man who 
was engaged in other lines of business could use for his hobbies. On 
cross-examination counsel for petitioners elicited from the witness the 
statement that his "major assumption" in forming his opinion on 
value was that the principal use of the premises was as a home and not 
as a farm. Petitioners, relying on what had been said in Charron's 
Case, immediately asked that all of the evidence of the expert be 
stricken, and excepted to the refusal by the trial judge. 
The use of the word "assumption" in describing the mental opera-
tion of the expert in categorizing the locus as a home and not a farm 
is unfortunate, but should not be permitted to obscure its true char-
acter. Here the expert personally observed the locus, and from his 
own factual observations could infer that it was not suitable for use as 
a farm. Insofar as it might be thought that that inference involved ex-
pert opinion, it would appear to be clearly within his competence as a 
real estate expert to formulate and state it. The intimation of the 
case, moreover, is that such an inference or opinion is within the com-
mon or normal experience of a Berkshire County jury, since the Court 
commented that "the jury took a view and from it could form their 
own judgment as to what the whole area had been used for before the 
taking." 5 On this basis, the inference needed no true expertness, but 
merely familiarity with the subject matter.6 In either view, there was 
certainly more than a mere "assumption" of a basic fact relied upon in 
the opinion. The Court therefore distinguished the case from the sit-
uation discussed in Charron's Case, on the ground that the opinion of 
the expert here was actually based primarily upon examination and 
observation of the land, by the expert himself. 
A case at the other extreme is found in State Tax Commission v. 
Assessors of Springfield.7 At a hearing before the Appellate Tax 
Board, an expert witness for the city was allowed over objection to 
state his opinion as to the value for tax purposes of the plant of tele-
phone and telegraph companies located in Springfield. The expert 
testified that he had based his opinion of value not only upon informa-
tion acquired from field inspections made by him or under his direc-
51955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 496,126 N.E.2d at 368. 
6 Cf. §22.5 supra, note 9. 
7331 Mass. 677, 122 N.E.2d 372 (1954). On the same day the Court disposed of a 
similar case involving the same issue. State Tax Commission v. Assessors of Haver-
hill, 331 Mass. 685, 122 N.E.2d 377 (1954). 
'\ 
\ 
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tion, but also on his own estimates and inferences as to the taxable 
property underground which he did not see and could not see, predi-
cated on company inventories and reports to the Tax Commissioner 
and conduit prints in the city engineer's office. His testimony was the 
only evidence in the case as to the property; the inventories, reports 
and prints were not in evidence. 
The Commission appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed, saying in part: 
The witness here was admittedly an expert qualified to give an 
opinion as to the value of the plant of a telephone company, but 
his experience did not enable him to provide by hearsay the only 
evidence of what the property was. The question, which is 
whether there was any basis for his opinion, is one of substance 
and not of form. . . . 
That the case was tried before an administrative tribunal and 
not in a court of law does not render it subject to a different prin-
ciple. To the slight extent that the record discloses what the prop-
erty was, there is hearsay exclusively.8 
8331 Mass. at 684-685, 122 N.E.2d at 376-377. 
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